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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Caldwell Scott McMullen appeals from his judgment of conviction entered on a guilty

He

plea for possession 0f a controlled substance (methamphetamine) with intent to deliver.

argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence.

Statement

Of The

On March

Facts

18,

And Course Of The

2018,

at

Proceedings

approximately 12:30 a.m., Ofﬁcer Willie Cowell, a patrol sergeant

with the Bonners Ferry Police Department, was working alone

Caldwell Scott McMullen.

(Tr., p. 5, L.

21

—

When he

p. 6, L. 7; p. 7, L.

21

—

initiated a trafﬁc stop

p. 8, L. 9.)

0f

Ofﬁcer Cowell

observed McMullen straddle two northbound lanes of a highway, weave between lanes, and cross
the fog line,

11, L.

1.)

all

Without activating a turn signal. (TL,

Ofﬁcer Cowell activated

roughly half a mile.

(Tr., p.

his

overhead

11, Ls. 5-13.)

p. 8, L.

lights,

When

but

19

p. 9, L. 22; p. 10, L. 18

McMullen

—

p.

did not pull over for

Ofﬁcer Cowell checked the

returned to a White Subaru Outback, While the vehicle driven by

Durango. (TL,

—

McMullen was

plates, they

a black

Dodge

p. 11, Ls. 14-25.)

As he approached

the vehicle occupied

Cowell smelled the odor 0f burnt marijuana.
recognized McMullen.

by McMullen and a male passenger, Ofﬁcer

(TL, p. 12, L. 8

—

He had previously arrested McMullen on

p. 13, L. 13.)

Ofﬁcer Cowell

a warrant in 2013, but

was

also

aware that McMullen was suspected by law enforcement ofﬁcers in Bonner and Lincoln Counties
of drug trafﬁcking.

(TL, p. 16, L. 15

—

p. 17, L. 14.)

McMullen had been stopped by Bonners Fen'y
at night

With a passenger

named

Additionally,

on two separate occasions

police ofﬁcers driving north through the city late

Katrina Morrison. (TL, p. 17, L. 15 — p. 18, L. 17.) In February

Ofﬁcer

of 2017,

methamphetamine.
Libby, Montana.
that she

Cowell
(Id.)

(Id.)

She stated

at the

with

time that she was bringing

it

ounce

an

approximately

of

from Sagle, Idaho,

to

Pressed t0 provide more detail regarding her origin in Sagle, she stated

was coming from Dufort Road.

on Dufort Road.

Morrison

Katrina

arrested

Ofﬁcer Cowell was aware

(Id.)

that

McMullen

resided

(Id.)

After Ofﬁcer Cowell explained the purpose of the stop, including that the plates were

registered to another vehicle,

15

— p.

23 —

13, L. 22.)

n0 warrants, While

On

Ofﬁcer Cowell returned

When he

p. 14, L. 3.)

McMullen provided what he claimed was
to his patrol car to

his passenger returned as a

(TL, p. 14, Ls. 19-24.)

Asked about

the smell,

the car.

(TL, p. 19, Ls. 1-21.) In addition, the

title

yet another vehicle, a 1982 Chevrolet sedan.

McMullen
borrowed

speculated that the

it,

McMullen and

p. 18, Ls. 18-25.)

title

but could not explain

his passenger denied

McMullen

woman who

Who had been

McMullen had provided was

(TL, p.

13, Ls.

14-22.)

speculated

he believed might

might have resulted from other people

for medical reasons, or

(Id.)

Ofﬁcer Cowell once again smelled

might have resulted from loaning the vehicle to a

smoke marijuana

(TL, p. 13, L.

citation.

suspended driver With n0 warrants.

having any marijuana on them or in the vehicle. (TL,
that the smell

complete a

(TL, p. 12, L.

title.

checked for outstanding warrants, McMullen returned as a felon with

returning to the vehicle with the citation,

marijuana.

the

associated With

Asked

to explain,

of the vehicle might have been removed by a friend

how

the

title

in

of a different vehicle came to be in

it.

who

(TL, p. 14,

Ls. 4-18.)

McMullen then
accepted.

offered t0

(TL, p. 19, L. 17

the vehicle while

—

let

Ofﬁcer Cowell search the vehicle, which offer was

p. 20, L. 1.)

McMullen stepped

out.

Ofﬁcer Cowell instructed the passenger
(Tr., p. 20, Ls. 2-21.)

to

Ofﬁcer Cowell then

remain in

stated:

“So

I’d like t0 pat

you down

you

as

step out 0f the vehicle,

make

(TL, p. 20, Ls. 13-21 (internal quotation marks omitted).)

palms on the vehicle.

(Id.)

Ofﬁcer Cowell conducted a

McMullen turned and placed

frisk for

bulge that he recognized to be methamphetamine and removed

had a burnt substance
1

,

it.

weapons and

felt

that

was

his

a signiﬁcant

(TL, p. 20, L. 22

—

p. 23, L.

Ofﬁcer Cowell then searched the vehicle and found a “brass pipe ﬁtting

18; p. 29, Ls. 8-17.)

3

you don’t have any weapons.”

sure

consistent With the odor of burnt marijuana.” (T12, p. 30, L. 7

that

—

p.

L. 4.)

McMullen was

arrested

0f drug paraphernalia.

(R., pp. 42-44.1)

Cowell was not justiﬁed

Ofﬁcer Cowell testiﬁed
112-22).

The

and charged with trafﬁcking

He ﬁled

in performing a frisk.

(ﬂ generally Tr., pp.

district court

concluded

in

methamphetamine and possession

a motion t0 suppress arguing that Ofﬁcer

(R., pp. 104-09.)

Following a hearing

5-52), the district court denied the

at

motion

which

(R., pp.

that:

Although McMullen did not appear t0 be under the inﬂuence of drugs, Cowell had
twice smelled the odor 0f burnt marijuana coming from the Dodge. He also had
information from multiple law enforcement agencies about McMullen’s possible
involvement with, and reputation for drug trafﬁcking. This information about
illegal drugs,

coupled With the stop taking place

at night, there

being a male

passenger in the Dodge, and McMullen’s loose ﬁtting clothing and Violations of
rules 0f the road,

McMullen posed
(R., p. 120.)

1

The

would cause a reasonably prudent person

district court therefore

McMullen mistakenly

t0 conclude that

a risk of danger.

states that

concluded that “speciﬁc and articulable facts

he was

initially

methamphetamine
later

—

to state a charge

p. 71, L. 18.

was charged with

to possession

E

alﬂ

While the
in

of possession With intent to deliver, those changes reﬂect the

“amend

the

charge [of trafﬁcking in

of methamphetamine With the intent t0 deliver.” (TL, p. 70, L.
denying motion t0 suppress that McMullen

R., p. 115 (noting in order

trafﬁcking).)

brief, p. 3.)

and notations amending the charge of trafﬁcking

plea agreement in which the state agreed t0

methamphetamine]
19

interlineations

to

charged With possession 0f methamphetamine

with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. (Appellant’s
information includes

known

Cowell
light

at the

moment 0f the

frisk,

taken together With rational inferences from those

facts, in

of his experience, justiﬁed Cowell’s suspicion that McMullen was armed and dangerous.”

(Id.)

After the denial of his motion t0 suppress,

another criminal case, CR11-18-624.

168-71.)

(E

McMullen

There was no written plea agreement submitted to the

indicated that the plea(s)

t0 appeal his

was (were)

(R., pp.

alﬂ

in

R., pp. 154-55,

district court.

On

156-64.)

conditional, but also indicated that he

What was

to

be recommended by the prosecutor.

marked both “Yes” and “No” when asked
legal.

(R., p. 160.)

if he

McMullen

that form,

was waiving

he

his right

(R., pp. 159-60.)

if his

He

also

understood that he was waiving his defenses, both

At no point did

retaining the right t0 appeal the denial 0f his

and

this

judgment(s) of conviction, but reserving the right t0 appeal his sentence(s)

sentence(s) exceeded

and

E

generally Tr., pp. 68-82.

completed a single Plea Advisory Form for both cases.

factual

entered guilty pleas

the form indicate that he believed that he

motion

to suppress, in particular.

was

At the change 0f

plea hearing, the district court judge explained that McMullen’s plea would not be conditional

and, that

by pleading

guilty,

suppress.

(Tr., p. 75, L.

wanted

make

to

21

—

sure that Mr.

he would waive the right t0 appeal the denial of his motion t0
p. 77, L.

16 (“But this

is

not a conditional plea.

McMullen understands. You’ve pled

guilty.

And

By doing

that’s

that,

What

you

I

are

giving up your right t0 d0 a motion t0 appeal a motion to suppress.”).)
In exchange for his guilty plea, the prosecutor agreed t0

amend

the trafﬁcking charge t0

possession with intent to deliver and dismiss the misdemeanor possession 0f paraphernalia
charge, With an agreed sentence of ﬁve years with

p. 72, L. 6.)

The

district court

two and a half years ﬁxed.

(Tr., p. 70, L.

entered judgment accordingly, ordering that the sentence

run concurrently with McMullen’s sentence in

CR1 1-18-624, and

indicated that

19

—

would

McMullen had

waived the

right t0 appeal

from

his

judgment of conviction.

nevertheless appealed. (R., pp. 139-41, 182-86.)

(R., pp.

168-71.)

McMullen

w
McMullen
Did the

states the issue

district court err

on appeal

When

it

as:

denied Mr. McMullen’s motion t0 suppress?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)

The
1.

state rephrases the issues as:

Did McMullen waive

his right to appeal the denial

of his motion t0 suppress by operation 0f

his guilty plea?

2.

Has McMullen

failed t0 establish that the district court erred

suppress evidence?

by denying

his

motion

t0

ARGUMENT
I.

McMullen Waived The Right T0 Appeal The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress Through His
Plea

A.

Introduction

Pursuant t0 a plea agreement with the

state,

McMullen pled

0f possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, the

state

guilty t0 an

agreed t0 dismiss the related

misdemeanor charge 0f possession 0f drug paraphernalia, and the
sentence

McMullen

McMullen’s
of I.C.R.

to

ﬁve years with two and a half years ﬁxed.

guilty plea

was not a conditional plea entered

Therefore, the plea waived

in

amended charge

district

(Tr., p. 70, L.

court agreed t0

19

— p.

72, L. 6.)

compliance With the requirements

non-jurisdictional defects

in the trial

proceedings, including any alleged error in the denial of his motion t0 suppress.

This appeal

11(a)(2).

all

should therefore be dismissed.

B.

Standard

Of Review

This Court “exercises free review over interpretation 0f statutes and the Idaho Criminal
Rules.” State V. Hillbroom, 158 Idaho 789, 791, 352 P.3d 999, 1001 (2015).

C.

McMullen’s Guilty Plea Was Not Conditional
It is

its

axiomatic and long-established that a statute or rule will be interpreted according t0

plain language and that

statutory construction.

E

Where the language
Johnson

V. State,

is

plain the court Will not resort t0 principles 0f

162 Idaho 213, 217, 395 P.3d 1246, 1250 (2017)

(“In the absence of a statutory deﬁnition, the language of a statute should

and ordinary meaning.” (quoting Albee

V. Judy,

be given

its

plain, usual

136 Idaho 226, 231, 31 P.3d 248, 253 (2001));

State V. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 920, 71 P.3d 1065, 1067 (Ct.

App. 2003) (“Where the language

of a rule

is

plain and unambiguous, this Court

must give

effect t0 the rule as written, without

engaging in statutory construction”).

A

guilty plea ordinarily constitutes a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects in the trial

proceedings.

State V. Kelchner, 130 Idaho 37, 39,

936 P.2d 680, 682 (1997). Such defects can

be preserved for appellate review only by entering a conditional guilty plea pursuant t0 I.C.R.
11(a)(2). Li. I.C.R. 11(a)(2) provides:

With

the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecuting attorney, a

defendant

may

enter a conditional plea of guilty, reserving in writing the right,

on

appeal from the judgment, t0 review any speciﬁed adverse ruling. If the defendant
prevails

0n appeal, the defendant must be allowed

to

Withdraw defendant’s

plea.

Therefore, in order t0 preserve a non-jurisdictional issue for appellate review, a defendant

who

pleads guilty must: (1) reserve in writing the right t0 appeal from the judgment; (2) specify in that
writing an adverse ruling the defendant

is

preserving the right to challenge 0n appeal; (3) obtain

the approval 0f the court for the reservation in that writing; and (4) obtain the consent 0f the

prosecuting attorney for the reservation expressed in that writing.

A

failure to

comply with the requirements of

issues not properly reserved for appellate review.

11 P.3d 1101,

I.C.R. 11(a)(2) results in waiver of

E, gg,

any

State V. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 889,

1107 (2000) (issue of alleged mishandling of evidence was waived by Hosey’s

conditional guilty plea, Where issue had not been reserved for review in writing); State V. Salinas,

134 Idaho 362, 367, 2 P.3d 747, 752

(Ct.

App. 2000) (holding

guilty plea requires the consent of the prosecutor,

present a speedy

trial

conditional guilty plea

issue

was

0n

direct appeal

and

When

that

an I.C.R. 11(a)(2) conditional

that Salinas did not preserve his right t0

the only adverse ruling he speciﬁed in his

the district court’s denial of his motion t0 suppress).

The record shows
I.C.R. 11(a)(2)

none 0f the necessary conditions

that

The

were satisﬁed.

change of plea hearing, the

was

conditional,

him

that

it

own

right to appeal,

afﬁrmed

Form

that

that

McMullen

indicated that the plea

right t0 appeal

from

addition, the only

was not

his

conditional plea.

district court

informing

23 —

p. 79, L.1

(T12, p. 77, Ls. 9-16; p. 78, L.

was not

conditional and

McMullen would be waiving

did not suggest that he had n0 interest in accepting such a plea and

comments

at the

change 0f plea hearing where the

it

district court

his

entered that judgment (R., p. 169).

In

mention of the motion to suppress, either in his Plea Advisory Form 0r
at the

change 0f plea hearing where the

would waive any appeal 0f the

p. 76, L. 2; p. 77, Ls. 9-16.)

district court

at the

twice stated

denial 0f his motion to suppress. (TL, p. 75, L. 21

Thus, the record shows that

district court t0 enter a conditional plea,

McMullen could

(R.,

McMullen waived

conditional, the district court indicated that

judgment 0f conviction When

change of plea hearing, was

that

conditional.

he understood he was waiving the right to appeal from his judgment 0f conviction

that the plea

the

he wanted t0 be sentenced that day).) McMullen indicated 0n his Plea Advisory

p. 159), and, in addition to its

0f the

would not be

At

attorney nor the prosecutor suggested in response that the

(after the district court stated that the plea

any

plea

and McMullen proceeded with the plea despite the

was not accepting a

imposed by

any written plea agreement.

district court explicitly stated that the

(TL, p. 77, Ls. 9-16.) Neither his
plea

parties did not submit

for a conditional plea

McMullen

and there

enter a conditional plea, that

is

—

did not obtain the permission

n0 indication the prosecutor agreed

McMullen

reserved in writing any right t0

appeal from the judgment, 0r that he speciﬁed any adverse ruling that he was preserving the right
t0 address

To

0n appeal.
the extent that

McMullen

(Appellant’s brief, p. 5 n. 3.)

He

suggests otherwise, he addresses the issue in a footnote.

points primarily t0 the fact that

McMullen checked “Yes” on

his Plea

Advisory Form When asked

reliance

on

that single

checkmark

if

he was entering a conditional plea.

to establish

guilty plea is unavailing for several reasons.

(Id.)

McMullen’s

he satisﬁed the requirements for a conditional

First,

he also indicated 0n the same form that he

understood that he was waiving his right t0 appeal from his judgment 0f conviction. (R.,
reason to think that the prosecutor or the

Second, there

is little

advisory form

when McMullen

change 0f plea hearing.

entered his plea.

(R., p. 156; Tr. p. 66.)

hearing was the district court asking whether
22), but there

was n0 discussion of its

court 0r the prosecutor reviewed

district court

it.

district court

The form was completed on

The only mention of the form

McMullen

Thus, there

content.

is

had reviewed

the

same day

at the

ﬁlled out and signed

p. 159.)

it

this

as the

change of plea

(TL, p. 69, Ls. 5-

nothing t0 suggest that the

district

and more importantly, as discussed above, the

Finally,

unequivocally stated that McMullen’s plea will not be conditional. (TL,

answer on the Plea Advisory Form suggested

p. 77, Ls.

McMullen

9-16.)

Thus, even

initially

thought he would be allowed to enter a conditional plea, there can be no dispute that the

district court

did not agree to accept a conditional plea, that

his plea

would be

There

also

is

if that single

conditional,

no evidence

and

that

McMullen

it

that

disabused him of the notion that

nevertheless went forward With the plea.

that prosecutor agreed t0 a conditional plea,

even

if

McMullen

initially

desired one.

Nor does

the Plea Advisory

to appeal the denial

Form anywhere

state that

of his motion t0 suppress, in

referenced by McMullen’s answers on the form

is

McMullen was

particular.

his sentence.

The only speciﬁc
(R., pp. 159-60.)

answers t0 the questions never reference his motion t0 suppress and the
that motion.

by

Therefore, even on the assumption that the form

the prosecutor and the district court that

McMullen could

10

reserving his right

trial

issue

McMullen’s

district court’s denial

of

somehow reﬂected an agreement

enter a conditional plea,

McMullen

did not specify the denial 0f his motion to suppress as an issue

to address

on appeal

as required

McMullen

Next,

by I.C.R.

11(a)(2).

reserving the right

Salinas, 134 Idaho at 367, 2 P.3d at 752.

points to his Notice 0f Appeal as evidence 0f “his intent to enter a

On October 25,

conditional plea.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 5 n. 3.)

district court

E

McMullen was

2018, just over a month after the

denied his motion to suppress, McMullen ﬁled a Notice 0f Appeal purporting to

appeal that denial. (R., pp. 139-41 .) This Court conditionally dismissed the appeal because there

was n0 ﬁnal judgment.
(R., pp. 168-70),

McMullen

(R., p. 152.)

Amended

ﬁled an

later

pled guilty and, after judgment was entered

Notice of Appeal (R., pp. 182-86).

McMullen’s premature

attempt t0 appeal the denial of his motion t0 suppress certainly suggests that he then desired t0

appeal that denial. But

plea.

To

does not suggest that he was

it

the contrary, as discussed above,

sentenced even after the

would be waiving
the fact that

district court

suggest in any

McMullen accepted

the plea and asked to be

(TL, p. 77, Ls. 9-16; p. 78, L. 23

to pursue

way that the prosecutor

so, or specify the issue that

unwilling to accept an unconditional

informed him that the plea would not be conditional and he

his right to appeal.

McMullen attempted

later

an appeal before

later

—

p. 79, L. 1.)

deciding to plead guilty

agreed t0 such a conditional plea, that the

was reserved

for appeal.

Nor does

McMullen’s subjective

district court

did

desire to pursue an

appeal does not satisfy the requirements for a conditional plea established by I.C.R. 11.
Finally,

the plea

McMullen claims

was 0r could be

that the district court

conditional.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 5 n. 3.)

any confusion 0r mistake on the part of the
and unambiguously stated

that, as

it

—

p. 77, L. 16.)

district court.

was understanding

McMullen would waive any appeal of the
(TL, p. 75, L. 21

was confused 0r mistaken about Whether

The

The record does not reﬂect

district court repeatedly, clearly,

the plea,

it

would not be conditional and

denial 0f his motion to suppress

by pleading

guilty.

Though McMullen expressed some uncertainty regarding

11

his

right to pursue

was intended

an appeal, neither the prosecutor nor his attorney expressed the View that the plea

to

be conditional.

The

(Id.)

have had about the nature 0f the plea by

What

you
16.)

I

wanted

t0

up your

are giving

The

make

district court

sure that Mr.

right t0

district court

stating,

McMullen

d0 a motion

“But

resolved any confusion

You’ve pled

motion

to appeal a

was not conﬁJsed about Whether

not a conditional plea.

this is

understands.

McMullen might

guilty.

it

that’s

doing

that,

(T12, p. 77, Ls. 11-

t0 suppress.”

the plea

By

And

was accepting was

conditional.

Neither does the record clearly reﬂect confusion 0n the part of the district court about

whether McMullen could have entered a conditional plea.
point, begin t0 say

p.

77, Ls. 5-16.)

district court

Immediately

thereafter, the district court

(Id.)

And,

And

that’s

just prior t0 saying

what

I

judge

did, at

one

(T12,

judge continued and clariﬁed, saying

wanted

to

make

sure that Mr.

McMullen

“you couldn’t really d0 a conditional plea —,” the

judge stated that “when you’re pleading

appeal unless you think the sentence was excessive.

know What

district court

“you couldn’t really d0 a conditional plea —,” before being interrupted.

“this is not a conditional plea.

understands.”

The

guilty,

then you’re giving up your right to

And we

you’re going t0 appeal.” (TL, p. 76, Ls. 17-24.)

It

agreed to the sentence, so

I

don’t

appears that the district court was

merely saying that the plea was not conditional because there was n0 agreement t0 reserve the
right to appeal

any particular

issue,

and he had agreed

t0 the sentence,

and there was therefore

nothing for the plea t0 be conditioned on.

More

importantly,

is

it

is

irrelevant

Whether the

district

court (correctly 0r

What

is

that the district court clearly did not agree t0 accept a conditional plea, there is

n0

mistakenly) thought that

dispositive

though,

McMullen could not have

entered a conditional plea.

evidence that the prosecutor agreed t0 a conditional plea, and there
right t0 appeal

is

no writing reserving the

from the judgment and specifying the order or issue reserved

12

for appeal.

Those

Whether McMullen entered a conditional plea under I.C.R. 11(a)(2),

facts settle the question

establishing that he did not.

This Court should therefore dismiss his appeal as barred by his

unconditional guilty plea.

II.

McMullen Has Not

To

Established That The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion

Suppress

A.

Introduction

Because McMullen waived his right to appeal any issues
Court should not reach the merits 0f his argument that the

motion

to suppress.

But

that

argument

fails

on

its

that

were not jurisdictional,

district court erred

merits as well.

McMullen

by denying

this

his

argues that the frisk

performed by Ofﬁcer Cowell, Which resulted in the discovery of methamphetamine, was
improper because Ofﬁcer Cowell did not have a reasonable suspicion that he was armed and
dangerous. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-13?) The district court correctly concluded otherwise. (R.,

p. 120.)

Under

the totality of the circumstances,

McMullen was armed and dangerous

own

safety.

Ofﬁcer Cowell had a reasonable suspicion

sufﬁcient t0 justify a brief frisk in an effort to ensure his

Those circumstances include the

fact that

McMullen was suspected of trafﬁcking

drugs; the association between drug trafﬁcking and being armed; evidence that

under the inﬂuence of drugs; the

2

McMullen does not argue

he improperly extended the

that

that

fact that the vehicle

McMullen was

Ofﬁcer Cowell was not justiﬁed

stop, that the consent given

in

McMullen was

driving had plates registered

in initiating the trafﬁc stop, that

by McMullen

to search his vehicle

was

in

any way deﬁcient or that it was not freely given, 0r that Ofﬁcer Cowell exceeded the scope 0f the
protective frisk 0n the assumption that he was justiﬁed in engaging in the frisk in the ﬁrst place.
In addition, below McMullen moved to suppress only “the evidence seized from McMullen’s
person.”

(R., p. 109.)

That

is,

he moved to suppress only the methamphetamine.

He

did not

argue that the drug paraphernalia recovered from his vehicle should be suppressed, and does not
address that evidence on appeal either.

13

and the

t0 another vehicle,

that there

he provided Ofﬁcer Cowell was for yet another vehicle; the

was another male passenger

Cowell was just about
Cowell

title

to turn his

t0

in the vehicle; the time

of night; and the fact that Ofﬁcer

conduct a search 0f McMullen’s vehicle, which would require Ofﬁcer

back 0n and focus from McMullen.

But, in the alternative, the methamphetamine that

t0 suppress

would

was

the subject of McMullen’s motion

inevitably have been discovered even absent the allegedly unjustiﬁed frisk. In

addition t0 being

arrested

for

trafﬁcking methamphetamine,

possession of drug paraphernalia. Even absent the

frisk, that

McMullen was

B.

arrested,

for

McMullen would have

and the methamphetamine would have been discovered incident

Standard

arrested

paraphernalia would have been

discovered in the search 0f McMullen’s vehicle to which he consented,

been

fact

t0 that arrest.

Of Review

This Court reviews “the denial of a motion t0 suppress using a bifurcated standard.”
State V. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 607,

389 P.3d

150,

152

(2016).

It

“accept[s] the trial court’s

ﬁndings 0f fact unless they are clearly erroneous.” Li (internal quotation marks omitted). But

“may

freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional principles in light

0f the

it

facts

found.” Li. (internal quotation marks omitted).

C.

Under The Totality Of The Circumstances, Ofﬁcer Cowell Had A Reasonable Suspicion
That McMullen Was Armed And Dangerous Sufﬁcient To Justify A Protective Frisk
Under

the Fourth

Amendment an ofﬁcer may “conduct

a limited self—protective pat

down

search 0f a detainee in order to remove any weapons.” State V. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 660, 152

P.3d

16,

21 (2007).

“Such a search

is

allowed to permit a police ofﬁcer t0 conduct the inquiry

Without fear of Violence being inﬂicted upon the ofﬁcer’s person.” Li. (internal quotation marks

14

The “primary concern” furthered by an ofﬁcer’s

omitted).

under appropriate circumstances

When

dealing With a person

patdown
frisk is

search, ‘the police

is

ability to

t0 “to protect the safety

who may pose

a risk.”

Li. at 661,

152 P.3d

suspicion’ cannot be articulated With precision.”

Li The

justify a

“The precise meaning of ‘reasonable
ultimate inquiry

is

an objective one,

would “warrant a man of

reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.”

1,

“To

336 P.3d 232, 238 (2014)

requiring the court t0 consider whether the facts available to the ofﬁcer

660, 152 P.3d at 21 (quoting Ter_ry V. Ohio, 392 U.S.

at 22.

that the person subjected to the

State V. Russo, 157 Idaho 299, 305,

(quoting Arizona V. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327 (2009)).

frisk

of ofﬁcers and others from harm

must harbor reasonable suspicion

armed and dangerous.”’

perform a protective

Henage, 143 Idaho

at

22 (1968)). The Idaho Supreme Court

has articulated factors that might be relevant to whether a protective frisk was appropriate,
including:

whether there were any bulges in the suspect’s clothing that resembled a weapon;
Whether the encounter took place late at night or in a high crime area; and Whether
the individual

made

threatening 0r furtive movements, indicated that he or she

possessed a weapon, appeared nervous or agitated, appeared to be under the

inﬂuence of alcohol or

illegal

was unwilling

drugs,

t0

cooperate, or had a

reputation for being dangerous.

State V. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 819,

however, because the

“test is

203 P.3d 1203, 1218 (2009).

This

not exhaustive,

list is

an objective one that asks whether, under the

totality

of the

circumstances, a reasonably prudent person would be justiﬁed in concluding that the individual

posed a risk of danger.”
121,

244 P.3d 261, 265

Li. at 818,

(Ct.

203 P.3d

1217.

E

also State V. Crooks, 150 Idaho 117,

App. 2010) (“the Bishop Court did not indicate

to consider in determining the reasonableness

was

at

of a belief that a suspect

exhaustive”).

15

is

that

its list

of factors

armed and dangerous

The

district court

disputed by McMullen.

made

extensive factual ﬁndings

McMullen

Instead,

(R., pp. 113-15),

argues that those facts did not give rise to a

reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous sufﬁcient t0 justify a

To support

brief, pp. 9-13.)

156 P.3d 1197

(Ct.

that View,

App. 2007).

Appeals concluded that four

he

0n

relies primarily

domestic

user;

and

In Davenport, the Court of

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-13.)

the

(3)

(4) the

from

Davenport,

ofﬁcer

was

aware

that

knew
the

the defendant from

was

defendant

a

defendant repeatedly placed his hands in his baggy pockets

notwithstanding instructions not to d0 so.

distinguishable

(Appellant’s

facts did not give rise to reasonable suspicion sufﬁcient t0 justify a

disturbances;

methamphetamine

frisk.

State V. Davenport, 144 Idaho 99,

protective frisk: (1) the encounter took place at night; (2) the ofﬁcer

prior

none 0f Which are

156 P.3d

Li. at 102,

involving

both

a

larger

at

1200.

number

considerations supporting Ofﬁcer Cowell’s reasonable suspicion that

This case

and

more

is

clearly

weighty

McMullen was armed and

dangerous.

First,

Ofﬁcer Cowell had reason

to

suspect that

McMullen was involved

in drug

trafﬁcking:

know
stop.

Cowell had arrested McMullen in 2013 0n a warrant. Cowell did not
McMullen was the driver of the Dodge prior t0 conducting the trafﬁc
However, after Cowell made contact with McMullen and learned his name,
that

Cowell also knew of McMullen as a result 0f
information sharing between him and detectives With both the Bonner County
Sheriff’s Ofﬁce and the Lincoln County Sheriff’s Ofﬁce. Cowell had received
information from those law enforcement agencies that McMullen was possibly

he recalled the prior 2013

arrest.

involved in drug trafﬁcking between Bonner County and Lincoln County. Lastly,

Cowell knew

that

two

BFPD

ofﬁcers 0n two separate occasions in late 2016

conducted trafﬁc stops 0f McMullen

late at night,

heading northbound through

town, With the same female passenger in the vehicle 0n both occasions. Cowell

amounts of methamphetamine, which
she told Cowell that she was bringing from Dufort Road in Sagle, Idaho, headed
t0 Libby, Montana. Through his correspondence With the Bonner County Sheriff’ s
Ofﬁce, Cowell was aware that McMullen at that time lived at 414 Dufort Road.
arrested that female in February 2017, with

16

Ofﬁcer Cowell testiﬁed

118 (footnote omitted).)

(R., p.

associated With the presence 0f weapons.

that

drug trafﬁcking

Due

(TL, p. 25, Ls. 5-16.)

is

frequently

t0 that association, the

suspicion of drug trafﬁcking or the presence 0f drugs contributes to reasonable suspicion that the

defendant

is

E

armed and dangerous.

weapons and Violence

CLoks, 150 Idaho

at 121,

are frequently associated With drug transactions,

ofﬁcer to believe that a person

may be armed and

Cir.

drug trafﬁcking.

this point is to

(Appellant’s brief, p. 11.)

He

ofﬁcer’s previous knowledge 0f the defendant

search, particularly if the ofﬁcer

trafﬁcking, 0r

at 102,

is

knows

156 P.3d

at 1200)),

the defendant

at 102, citing

and defendant placed

the

cited

his

Bustos—Torres, 396 F.3d 935,

may also

contribute t0 justiﬁcation for a protective

that a defendant carries a

United States

hand

brief, p.

weapon,

is

involved in drug

11 (quoting Davenport,

144

had been convicted of drug trafﬁcking offenses. See
v.

Cornelius, 391 F.3d 965, 966 (8th Cir. 2004) (ofﬁcer

arrests,

knew he had

in his jacket pocket

outstanding drug distribution warrants,

and did not obey ofﬁcer’s directive to remove
it is

correct that Cornelius, one of

by Davenport, found reasonable suspicion based

knowledge of prior drug
965, 966-67,

suspected of

quotes Davenport for the proposition that “[a]n

(Appellant’s brief, p. 11 (emphasis in original).) While

cases

V.

is

but points out that “the case the Court [in Davenport] relied

recognized defendant from previous

it).”

reasonable for an

note that he had never been arrested for

predisposed t0 Violence,” (Appellant’s

upon was one where
Davenport

it is

265 (“‘Because

2005)) (collecting cases)).

McMullen’s primary response on

Idaho

at

dangerous when the person

being involved in a drug transaction.’” (quoting United States

943 (8th

244 P.3d

arrests (not, as

Davenport did not suggest

McMullen
that

it is

17

in part

0n the ofﬁcer’s

suggests, convictions), Cornelius, 391 F.3d

only information about previous drug

arrests,

and no other information linking the defendant
reasonable suspicion that the defendant

suggested by Idaho law.

engaged in drug

t0 possible drug activity, that contributes t0 a

armed and dangerous. Nor

is

An ofﬁcer can obviously have

activity absent information about

is

such a rule otherwise

a reasonable suspicion that a defendant

any previous drug

and dangerous. In CLoks, for example, notwithstanding the lack of information
about any previous drug

arrests, the

home

his presence in a

in

at

which the ofﬁcer believed drug

121-22, 244 P.3d at 265-66.

P.3d 625, 629

(Ct.

McMullen was

App. 2011) (holding

E

0f a person

ﬁndings above, that

Ofﬁcer Cowell’s suspicion

was aware

that

that

is

between drug

that

259

was

and weapons

activity

in danger).

Ofﬁcer Cowell “had simply heard rumors

whom

[he] had,

Mr.

that

on a separate occasion, arrested

As

set

for

out in the

factually inaccurate as a characterization 0f the grounds for

McMullen may be involved

McMullen was suspected of drug

from two separate law enforcement agencies.
aware

CLoks,

dangerous.

possessing less than an ounce 0f methamphetamine.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 11.)
district court’s

in the opinion

also State V. Roias-Tapia, 151 Idaho 479, 483,

that association

additionally suggests that

in the presence

armed

be occurring, which

sales to

may be armed and

partially justiﬁed ofﬁcer’s reasonable suspicion that his safety

McMullen

is

ofﬁcer suspected the defendant 0f drug activity because 0f

contributed to reasonable suspicion that the defendant

150 Idaho

such a

arrests and, in

circumstances, that information contributes t0 a reasonable suspicion that the defendant

is

in drug trafﬁcking.

Ofﬁcer Cowell

trafﬁcking based on information he received

(R., p. 118; Tr., p. 17, Ls. 4-14.)

McMullen had been stopped 0n two

He was

also

separate occasions driving late at night heading

north through town With Katrina Morrison, that he had later arrested Katrina Morrison under

similar circumstances With nearly a trafﬁcking

amount of methamphetamine, and

18

that she stated

she

was coming from Dufort Road,

in Sagle, Idaho, the

same

street

on Which McMullen

lived.

(R., p. 118; Tr., p. 18, Ls. 2-17.)

Second, Ofﬁcer Cowell had reason to suspect that McMullen’s vehicle contained drugs

and

that

McMullen was

presently under the inﬂuence of drugs.

As Cowell approached

the

Dodge

to

make

initial contact,

he smelled the odor of

burnt marijuana coming from the Dodge. Later, after returning t0 the
his patrol car With the

completed

citation,

Dodge from

Cowell again smelled burnt marijuana,

and the odor was sustained.
(R., p. 118.)

Reason

to suspect that drugs are in a vehicle or reason t0 believe that

one or more

of the occupants 0f the vehicle are under the inﬂuence of drugs contributes t0 reasonable
suspicion that the occupants are armed and dangerous.

E

State V. Johnson, 137 Idaho 656, 661,

51 P.3d 1112, 1117 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that ofﬁcer’s belief that defendant

inﬂuence 0f marijuana contributed t0 justiﬁcation for protective
152 P.3d

at

22 (“evidence

an ingredient in the
P.3d

at

that the friskee is

totality

under the inﬂuence of an

M,
illicit

143 Idaho

at

661,

drug might serve as

of the circumstances inquiry”); Davenport, 144 Idaho

at 103,

156

1201 (“An ofﬁcer’s observation 0f an individual’s demeanor, including his attitude,

nervousness, signs that he

may

frisk);

was under

is

under the inﬂuence of drugs 0r alcohol, 0r other unusual behavior

also give rise t0 reasonable fear for an ofﬁcer’s safety”); United States V. Sakyi, 160 F.3d

164, 169 (4th Cir. 1998) (“In the absence 0f ameliorating factors, the risk 0f danger to an ofﬁcer

from any occupant of a vehicle he has stopped, when the presence of drugs
suspected but probable cause for arrest does not exist,

is

readily apparent”).

is

reasonably

In both cases, an

ofﬁcer has reason t0 be concerned that the occupant 0f the vehicle will take Violent action to
prevent the discovery of

may

act irrationally

illegality,

and an occupant presently under the inﬂuence of narcotics

and unpredictably.

E

Johnson, 137 Idaho

19

at

661, 51 P.3d at 117 (holding

that belief that defendant

was under the inﬂuence 0f marijuana contributed

concern for his safety because

it

to ofﬁcer’s reasonable

increased the likelihood that defendant might act rashly and to

prevent the ofﬁcer from discovering contraband).

McMullen
was aware
that

notes that, in Davenport, the Court of Appeals stated “‘although the ofﬁcer

Davenport was a methamphetamine

that

Davenport was under the inﬂuence 0f drugs

brief, p. 11

time of the encounter.

t0 believe

999

While

true here.

it is

certainly

true that

be reasonably concerned about his

initially

pulled over for swerving across lanes and over the fog line 0n

turned 0n his overhead lights. (R., pp. 117-18; Tr., p.

and the smell of marijuana contributed

may be under the inﬂuence

of drugs,

McMullen was

Third,

title

so.

safety.

Ofﬁcer Cowell did not report any concerning behavior when speaking with

the highway, and he then failed t0 pull over for approximately half a mile after

unable t0 do

is

both that the vehicle contained drugs and that McMullen

to eliminate that possibility to

McMullen, McMullen was

provided the

(Appellant’s

McMullen’s passenger, and not McMullen, was smoking marijuana, Ofﬁcer Cowell

was not required
it is

he thought

that

The opposite

the inﬂuence, as the vehicle smelled of recently burnt marijuana.

possible that

Though

at the

no indication

(quoting Davenport, 144 Idaho at 103, 156 P.3d at 1201).)

Ofﬁcer Cowell had reason

was under

user, there is

t0

8, L.

19

—

p. 11, L. 1.)

erratically,

and

may be armed and

that

that

conduct

McMullen

dangerous.

driving a vehicle With plates registered t0 another vehicle, and

t0 yet another vehicle. (R., pp. 113-14.)

Asked

t0 explain,

—

safety, in part,

because of these “inconsistencies.”

(T12, p. 23, L.

incorrect plates

may

the incorrect plates

indicate that a vehicle

title

is stolen,

and McMullen’s

20
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McMullen was

was concerned about

(TL, p. 14, Ls. 4-18.) Ofﬁcer Cowell testiﬁed that he

coupled with the incorrect

Both

Ofﬁcer Cowell’s reasonable suspicion

may act

Ofﬁcer Cowell

his

p. 25, L. 9.)

Because

on McMullen’s

vehicle,

inability to explain, contributed t0 reasonable

suspicion that he

may have been armed and

61, 195 P.3d 716, 719-20 (Ct.

App. 2008) (holding

the fact that the vehicle driven

suggesting that the vehicle

App. 2008) (holding

dangerous.

was

by

the defendant

stolen); In re

E

State V. Martin, 146 Idaho 357, 360-

that protective frisk

was justiﬁed

had plates belonging

in part

to another vehicle,

Doe, 145 Idaho 980, 984, 188 P.3d 922, 926

that certain crimes, like burglary, are

more

by

(Ct.

likely to involve suspects that are

armed and dangerous).
Fourth, the encounter occurred late at night, at approximately 12:30

McMullen responds

to this point ﬁrst

signiﬁcant if the location

is

by noting

that the time

6

is

the Court articulated the

consideration as “whether the encounter took place late at night 0r in a high crime area.”

146 Idaho

at

would have
at night

even

frisk.

m

While

it is

mp,

certainly true that an ofﬁcer

additional reason to be concerned about his safety if an encounter occurred both late

and

night,

819, 203 P.3d at 1218 (emphasis added).

“most

(Appellant’s brief, p. 10

Mp,

In

(R., p. 118.)

of the encounter

dangerous or associated With crime.’”

(quoting Davenport, 144 Idaho at 102, 156 P.2d at 1200).)

am.

in a high crime area,

if

it is

nevertheless true that, where an encounter occurs late at

not in a high crime area, that fact contributes to the justiﬁcation for a protective

State V. Smith, 159 Idaho 15, 22-23,

355 P.3d 644, 651-52

(Ct.

App. 2015)

(citing the

fact that the encounter occurred late at night as contributing to the justiﬁcation for a protective

frisk,

With n0 mention of the encounter occurring in a high crime area).

am.

Next,

“not particularly late at night.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 11.)

McMullen
It is

more

than late enough to constitute a factor contributing to the justiﬁcation for the protective

frisk.

suggests that 12:30

E

is

State V. Kester, 137 Idaho 643, 647, 51 P.3d 457, 461 (Ct.

occurred

late at night, at

App. 2002)

approximately 11:00 p.m., contributed to justifying

21

(fact that

frisk).

encounter

Fifth,

p. 119.)

McMullen was wearing

McMullen protests

loose-ﬁtting clothing that could easily hide a weapon.

(R.,

that:

While one of the factors inﬂuencing Whether a reasonable person in the ofﬁcer’s
position would conclude that a particular person was armed and dangerous is
“whether there were any bulges in the suspect’s clothing that resembled a
weapon” State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 819 (2009), loose-ﬁtting clothing is not a
factor justifying such a conclusion.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 13.)

He

cites

no authority

for the proposition that loose-ﬁtting clothing is

not a factor that can contribute t0 reasonable suspicion that a defendant

(Id.)

Though

that “its list

m

did not

list

armed and dangerous.

loose-ﬁtting clothing as a factor, that case also did not suggest

0f factors t0 consider in determining the reasonableness 0f a belief that a suspect

armed and dangerous was exhaustive.” CLoks, 150 Idaho
have considered as a factor

E

is

Kiter, 137 Idaho

at

that

at 121,

244 P.3d

at

is

265. Idaho courts

an item worn by the defendant could easily conceal a weapon.

647, 51 P.3d at 461 (in determining that frisk

factor that ofﬁcer observed that the defendant

was

justiﬁed, noting as

“was wearing a ‘fanny pack,’ Which could conceal

a weapon”). Courts in other jurisdictions have likewise and for similar reasons pointed to baggy
0r loose-ﬁtting clothing, of the sort

Snﬂ,

656 F.3d 498, 504 (7th

Cir.

McMullen was wearing
201

concealed a weapon as factor in justifying
clothing alone

would

1)

Si, gg, United

(citing fact that loose-ﬁtting clothes

frisk);

certainly not justify

here.

frisk.

But,

in

the totality 0f the

circumstances, the fact that McMullen’s clothing could easily have concealed a

that

he would see a “bulge”

carrying a weapon—contributes t0 the conclusion that the protective frisk

Sixth, there

was another male passenger

could have

Lakli, 160 F.3d at 169 (same). Loose or baggy

a protective

Ofﬁcer Cowell would not have any conﬁdence

States V.

in the vehicle.

weapon—so

if

McMullen were

was justiﬁed

(R., p. 119.)

that

here.

“[T]he possibility 0f

a Violent encounter [during a trafﬁc stop] stems not from the ordinary reaction of a motorist

22

stopped for a speeding Violation, but from the fact that evidence 0f a more serious crime might be

uncovered during the stop.”

Maryland

Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997).

V.

Because “the

motivation 0f a passenger t0 employ Violence t0 prevent apprehension 0f such a crime
bit as great as that

0f the driver,” the danger t0 an ofﬁcer

passengers in addition to the driver in the stopped car.”

“is likely to

Li.

Last,

137 Idaho

at

Ofﬁcer Cowell conducted the protective

Cowell consent
114-15.)

E Johw,

to search his vehicle

“The purpose of

Recognizing that

661, 5 1 P.3d at 1117.

frisk just after

Where an ofﬁcer

that a defendant

An

car, turn his

(R., pp.

Adams

V.

Williams, 407 U.S.

is

diverted from the occupants and the ofﬁcer

is

in a

ofﬁcer already faced with a number 0f factors suggesting

dangerous “could not reasonably be expected t0 leave

may be armed and

Defendant in his patrol

that search.

conducting a search of a vehicle with one 0r more

is

occupants standing by, the ofﬁcer’s focus
particularly vulnerable position.

McMullen gave Ofﬁcer

not t0 discover evidence 0f crime, but to allow

the ofﬁcer t0 pursue his investigation without fear of Violence.”

143, 146 (1972).

fact, courts in

a factor contributing

is

and just before Ofﬁcer Cowell began

[a protective frisk] is

every

be greater when there are

Idaho have held that the fact that there are multiple occupants of a vehicle
t0 justifying a protective frisk.

is

back on Defendant,

insert his

head

into Defendant’s car,

and

search the car without ﬁrst checking Defendant for weapons.” United States V. Maniarrez, 348

F.3d 881, 887 (10th
112228,

at

Cir. 2003).

E

also

Gibbs

V.

McNeil, N0. 4:12CV00316 JLH, 2014

*4 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 10, 2014) (holding that

it

was reasonable

a protective frisk “before entering the vehicle t0 search

conducting the search”); Stoker

was justiﬁed
other

V. State,

in looking in the cigarette

it

WL

for the ofﬁcer to conduct

to ensure that

he was safe while

170 S.W.3d 807, 813—14 (Tex. App. 2005) (“Fabbiani

box

in order t0 determine

weapon before he searched Appellant’s

can”).
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Whether

it

contained a knife 0r

In Johnson the Idaho Court of Appeals

likewise recognized that a contributing factor t0 justifying a protective frisk

was about

to

engage in a consent search of a vehicle, which would put the ofﬁcer

some assurance

that the occupants

were not armed.

Ofﬁcer Cowell had good reason
that

he had good reason to believe

that

McMullen had drugs

vehicle driven

which

middle of the night.

is

t0 suspect

facts

Johﬂ,

137 Idaho

for

in drugs,

He had good

plates registered t0 another vehicle, With a

McMullen could not

explain.

an activity

reason to believe

title

in the

loose-ﬁtting clothing that could easily conceal a

t0 turn his attention

and was justiﬁed

The

associated with

The encounter took place

from McMullen and

search of the vehicle. Under those circumstances, Ofﬁcer Cowell

in danger

without

661, 5 1 P.3d at 1117.

There was another male passenger present, putting Ofﬁcer Cowell

was

at risk

and was currently under the inﬂuence of drugs.

McMullen was wearing

Ofﬁcer Cowell was about

his safety

at

McMullen of trafﬁcking

associated with weapons.

in his vehicle

by McMullen had

yet another vehicle,

weapon.

that the ofﬁcer

is

at greater risk.

his passenger t0 conduct a

was reasonable

in performing a brief, non-intrusive

to suspect that

pat—down search

weapons.

D.

If This

Of McMullen Was Not Justiﬁed,
T0 Afﬁrm The District Court

Court Determines That The Protective Frisk

Should Apply The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine

“The exclusionary

rule

is

the judicial

remedy

for addressing illegal searches

admission or use 0f evidence gathered pursuant t0 the

illegal search.”

State V.

It

and bars the

Rowland, 158

Idaho 784, 786-87, 352 P.3d 506, 508-09 (Ct. App. 2015). “The inevitable discovery doctrine

is

an exception t0 the exclusionary rule that was established by the United States Supreme Court in

Nix

v.

Williams,

467 U.S. 431, 444, 104

2501, 2509, 81 L.Ed.2d 377, 387-88 (1984) and

S. Ct.

adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Stuart

1285-87 (2001).”

Li.

v.

State,

136 Idaho 490, 497-99, 36 P.3d 1278,

“[T]he inevitable discovery doctrine applies
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when

a preponderance 0f the

evidence demonstrates that the evidence discovered pursuant to an unlawful search or seizure

would have

inevitably been discovered

by lawful methods.”

Li. at 787,

352 P.3d

at

“This

509.

doctrine balances society’s interests in deterring illegal police conduct and in having juries

receive

all

probative evidence 0f a crime by only applying the exclusionary rule to put the

government

in the same, not a worse, position than

misconduct.” Li.

“When

the discovery of the evidence

of other lawful means, the exclusionary rule
apply.”

Li.

it

fails t0

would have occupied absent
would have been

must be the

result

inevitable as the result

serve this purpose, and, therefore, does not

“Although those lawful means need not be the

investigation, they

the police

result

of a wholly independent

of some action that actually took place (0r was in the

process 0f taking place) that would inevitably have led t0 the discovery of the unlawfully

obtained evidence.” Li. (internal citations omitted).
In addition t0 arguing that the protective frisk

that the

methamphetamine discovered

absent the frisk because

in that frisk

was

would

McMullen had given consent

recovered drug paraphernalia,

district court

alternative argument.

if

it

t0 search his vehicle, that search in fact

arrested for that crime,

his arrest.

(TL, p. 48, L. 5

determined that the protective frisk was justiﬁed,

This Court

may d0

so,

however, and should afﬁrm 0n

it

—

frisk.

E

did not reach this

this alternative basis

State V. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217,

231, 236 (2019) (noting that an appellate court

presented to but not addressed by the district court).

25

may afﬁrm

and the

p. 49, L. 3.)

considers the merits of McMullen’s appeal and determines that Ofﬁcer Cowell

justiﬁed in performing a protective

below

inevitably have been discovered even

McMullen would have been

methamphetamine would have been discovered during
Because the

justiﬁed, the prosecutor argued

was not

_, 443

P.3d

based on an alternative ground

On appeal, McMullen argues
0n several speculative

that the inevitable discovery doctrine is inapplicable, relying

possibilities t0

contend that the preponderance 0f the evidence does not

methamphetamine would have been discovered absent the

establish that the

“[t]he State did not establish that

frisk

because (1)

Mr. McMullen would not have revoked his consent t0 search

the car prior t0 the discovery of the paraphernalia” (Appellant’s brief, p. 15 n. 5); (2) “the State

failed t0 establish

Whether the item of paraphernalia would be possessed by the driver or the

passenger, Where the location of the item in the vehicle

14); and, (3)

though the

arrestable offense,

it

state

was ambiguous” (Appellant’s

brief, p.

presented evidence that the possession of paraphernalia was an

did not present evidence that

McMullen would have been

arrested for

it

(Appellant’s brief, p. 14).

McMullen

is

correct that the prosecutor did not present evidence that

McMullen would

not have withdrawn his consent t0 search his vehicle before Ofﬁcer Cowell could do so if Ofﬁcer

Cowell had not performed a
Cowell had not performed a
vehicle.

Those bare

was not required

Neither did the prosecutor present evidence

frisk.

frisk,

possibilities are not in

t0 proactively rebut

them

t0

any way reﬂected

it.

frisk.

and the prosecutor

When

Ofﬁcer Cowell conducted the

his consent t0 search his vehicle

(TL, p. 19, L. 17

McMullen would have suddenly withdrawn

in the record

show, by a preponderance 0f the evidence, that the

McMullen had only just given

so that Ofﬁcer Cowell could search

frisk,

Ofﬁcer

he would not have suddenly decided t0 forego a search 0f the

paraphernalia would have been discovered absent the

protective frisk,

that, if

his consent

if,

—

p. 20, L. 21.)

and stepped out

Nothing suggests

that

instead 0f ﬁrst conducting a protective

Ofﬁcer Cowell had immediately searched the vehicle.
Likewise, McMullen’s argument that he would not have been arrested for possession 0f

drug paraphernalia

if

Ofﬁcer Cowell had not already discovered the methamphetamine
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is

based

on bare speculation
the

that is contravened

methamphetamine,

“it is

without arresting him even

if

and

that

would have assumed

in fact arrested

in fact

in his possession. Contrary t0

form

suggests that, absent ﬁnding

the brass ﬁtting containing

t0 cite

McMullen

he did determine the paraphernalia belonged to McMullen.

Ofﬁcer Cowell

(R., pp. 10-12.)

McMullen

Ofﬁcer Cowell might have elected

McMullen was

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-15.)

McMullen’s car was

record.

unlikely the ofﬁcer

residue belonged t0 McMullen,”

paraphernalia.

by the

and charged with possession of the

concluded that the paraphernalia found in

McMullen’s claim

that

Ofﬁcer Cowell would

he had not ﬁrst found the methamphetamine, the

have been “unlikely”

to

methamphetamine

Wholly unrelated to the question Whether McMullen was in possession of

the paraphernalia.

arrested

the

is

Finally,

that conclusion if

and for similar reasons,

in light

and charged with possession of paraphernalia,

record,

t0

suggest

it is

0f the fact that McMullen was in fact
pure speculation, based 0n nothing in

he would not have been arrested absent discovery 0f the

that

methamphetamine.

The preponderance 0f

the evidence supports that the

methamphetamine discovered on

McMullen’s person would have been discovered even absent the protective

McMullen was
protective frisk

arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia.

was unjustiﬁed,

it

If this

When

Court concludes that the

should afﬁrm on that alternative basis.
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frisk

CONCLUSION
The
alternatively,

state

respectfully

afﬁrm the

requests

that

this

Court

dismiss

McMullen’s

appeal

0r,

of McMullen’s motion t0 suppress and afﬁrm his

district court’s denial

judgment of conviction.

DATED this

19th day of August, 2019.

/s/

Andrew V. Wake

ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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